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 2 
Introduction 
As I interact with and learn from people of diverse cultures and backgrounds, I 
am confronted with the reality that my internalization of information, as well as the kinds 
of information and the ways in which it is presented to me, is shaded by my own identity 
and how others perceive me. In understanding my own cultural lens, I recognize that my 
ethnicity, age, gender, and upbringing have—and will continue to have—a profound 
impact on my worldview. I am a Caucasian woman originally from a suburban 
neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts. I am currently 21 years old and am studying 
political science and philosophy at Wesleyan University, a private liberal arts university 
in Connecticut.  
I believe that one of the most important aspects of my personal bias is recognizing 
the extent to which I am influenced by people who have shared their stories with me, 
both in passing and through ongoing relationships. As Sister Peggy of El Salvador (by 
way of New Jersey) says, we are social creations—each of our identities is a 
conglomeration of the many individuals with whom we come into contact. Each person 
shapes us, if we are open to being shaped, by describing to us his or her personal 
experiences and unique perspective on the world. The people with whom I have come 
into contact have collectively taught me that in every situation, multiple sides exist to the 
same story and that it is necessary to be open to them all. It is with that sentiment that I 
enter into my research—in seeking to understand the complexities of war and the 
attempts at limiting violence through moral imperatives. 
After finishing high school, I lived in Jerusalem, Israel for one year where I 
participated in a program that was meant to mentally prepare Israelis for serving in the 
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army. My experiences there illuminated the notion that the military and war, as well as a 
commitment to justice and compassion, are deeply rooted in the Israeli mentality and 
culture. I therefore began to think profoundly about the ability of morality to potentially 
restrict the scope of violence during war so that civilians are kept safe. Since I have come 
to the unfortunate realization that war will always exist, I have become interested in 
investigating the ability of powerful countries, such as the United States, to constrain the 
damage war inevitably inflicts on civilian populations.  
My question originally concentrated on the United States’ moral responsibility in 
funding proxy armies in terms of the relative precautions taken when enlisting proxy 
troops as opposed to U.S. troops. I theorized that the United States would be less careful 
with proxy armies than they would be with U.S. soldiers since losing U.S. lives overseas 
would cause greater public outcry than would losing lives of “others” in the form of 
electoral pressure. I imagined that considerations for entering into war using a proxy 
army would most emphasize the army’s chance of winning, as opposed to potential 
soldier fatalities. I learned, however, that although the United States may not weigh the 
same issues equally among U.S. and proxy armies, it does work to ensure that its foreign 
troops are well equipped and cared for in order to ensure their success. The United States, 
for example, supplied the Contras with, among other things, expensive military 
technology, comfortable living arrangements, high-quality food, and strategic aerial 
photos in order to aid their fight.1  
My principle question therefore has shifted from how the United States supports 
its proxy troops to how it maintains a helpful, yet distant, relationship with the army it 
funds, as well as how it ensures the just treatment of the opposing forces and of civilians 
                                                        
1
 Sam Dillon. Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua's Contra Rebels. New York: H. Holt, 1991. Pages 82, 85 
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during war. Thus, my research will address the Contra forces’ motivations for fighting, 
their perceptions of the United States, and their considerations for human rights issues. I 
will begin with a brief history of Nicaraguan politics and Cold War dynamics, including 
an explanation of the military strategy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), which was a 
common United States tactic among Cold War-related proxy conflicts in the 1980s.2 
 
Methodology 
During my research, I spent the majority of my time in Managua, where I 
conducted interviews with former Contras and collected background information on the 
political dynamics at play both nationally in Nicaragua and internationally with respect to 
the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the 1980s. I was able to find material 
in books, articles, government publications, and declassified United States political 
documents. I also spent three days in Esteli, one day in Jinotega, and one day in 
Matagalpa where I interviewed other former Contras, as well as individuals who are 
knowledgeable about human rights issues within the Contra forces. I asked interviewees 
questions pertaining to their motivations for fighting with the Contras, their perceptions 
of the United States’ involvement in the war, and their familiarity with human rights 
regulations in the army. I digitally recorded each interview to review afterwards and took 
detailed notes during the meetings themselves.  
 
 
 
                                                        
2
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and 
Antiterrorism in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon, 1988. Page 3 
 5 
Limitations 
The greatest limitation to my study is the inadequate access to information about 
U.S. governmental policy and the U.S. government’s relationship with the Nicaraguan 
Contra military leadership. Although I was able to consult various declassified U.S. 
government documents and investigative books, the topics addressed in them are by no 
means exhaustive. Furthermore, I assume that the sensitive nature of discussing human 
rights concerns with the Contra interviewees, which could potentially carry personal 
ramifications, may have restricted the type of information I was able to receive. Although 
all of the individuals I interviewed spoke candidly about their experiences, I imagine that 
they held back from revealing certain unfavorable aspects of their military service. 
 
Profiles of Interviewees 
Rosibel Irías Aceredo – Director of Las Comisiones de Justicia y Paz de la Diócesis de 
Estelí (CJPE) 
Judy Butler – Published author on Atlantic Coast history and politics 
Róger Espinoza Coronel, nom de guerre “Ranchero” – Former Contra commander and 
current President of the Asociación de Discapacitados de la Resistencia 
Nicaragüense (ADRN) 
Luis Frank Zelaya Escalante – Volunteer with the Asociación Nicaragüense Pro-
Derechos Humanos (ANPDH) of Esteli 
Azucena Ferrey – Social Christian Party member of the Nicaraguan Resistance political 
directorate  
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Luis Fley, nom de guerre “Comandante Johnson” – Former Contra commander and the 
Contra Army’s Chief Legal Prosecutor  
Mercedes Fley – Human rights activist and leader of Mothers of Political Prisoners 
Oscar Manuel Salbavarro Garcia, nom de guerre “Comandante Rubén – Former Contra 
commander 
Edén Pastora Gomez, nom de guerre “Comandante Cero” – Leader and commander of 
The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) 
Antonio Hodgsone – Former Contra fighter in Kakabila, Atlantic Coast 
Johnny Hodgsone – Representative of the political party for the Región Autónoma del 
Atlántico Sur (RAAS) 
Fanor Perez Mejra, nom de guerre “Hombrito” – Former Contra commander and current 
leader of the civil FDN branch in Jinotega 
Roberto Petray – Executive Director of the Asociación Nicaragüense Pro-Derechos 
Humanos (ANPDH) 
Felix Pedro Cruz Rodríguez, nom de guerre “Comandante Gehu” – Former Contra 
commander and volunteer with the Asociación de Discapacitados de la 
Resistencia Nicaragüense (ADRN) 
Maximino Rodriguez, nom de guerre “Comandante Wilmer” – Former Contra 
commander and President of the Military Justice Tribunal 
Jasper Theodore Swartz – Member of the territorial government of Kakabila and the 
Kakabila community judge 
Paul Swartz – former Contra fighter in Kakabila, Atlantic Coast 
 7 
Noel Vardez, nom de guerre “Brack” – Former Contra fighter and current leader of the 
civil FDN branch in Matagalpa 
Pedro Jose Mora Zapata, nom de guerre “Doctor Orlando,” or Doctor Mora – Former 
Contra medical doctor 
Germán Zeledón, nom de guerre “El Enano” – Former Contra commander and former 
mayor of Jinotega for the PLC party 
 
History 
Nicaraguan History 
After Nicaragua became independent in 1838, civil wars constantly erupted 
between the liberal elite of León and the conservative elite of Granada.3 In 1855, the first 
involvement of a North American in Nicaraguan affairs came with the liberal party’s 
invitation for William Walker to lead their fight against the conservatives. Shortly after 
Walker forcefully established himself as president, the majority of Nicaragua, as well as 
Honduras and Costa Rica, united to drive Walker out of the country in 1857, after which 
time the conservatives ruled for 30 years. In 1893, the liberal José Santos Zelaya staged a 
military coup and took over the government, maintaining power until 1909 when the 
United States provided support to the conservatives for his overthrow. The United States 
at the time was pursuing a monopoly over canals through Central America and as it 
already controlled the Panama Canal, it wanted to ensure that France would not make a 
deal with President Zelaya to construct a canal through Nicaragua. From 1910 to 1926, 
the conservative party, headed by the Chamorro family, controlled the government of 
Nicaragua with the help of the U.S. Marines, who occupied Nicaragua from 1912 until 
                                                        
3
 Dora Maria Telléz: La Historia de Nicaragua, parte dos. 14 Febrero 2012. Managua, Nicaragua. 
 8 
1933. In 1914, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, which gave the United States complete 
jurisdiction over the territory of the Nicaraguan canal. The United States removed its 
marines in 1925, only to reinstate them in 1926 due to another civil war between the 
liberals and conservatives, entitled the Constitutional War. In 1927, the United States 
brokered an agreement called the Pacto de Espino Negro to resolve the civil war and 
promised to remain in Nicaragua to oversee the 1928 elections and organize a non-
partisan police force, which eventually became the Guardia Nacional, or the Nicaraguan 
National Guard. Although most politicians and fighters agreed to sign the pact, Augusto 
César Sandino refused and instead continued fighting against the U.S. Marines with his 
small guerrilla army. Due to the Great Depression and casualties inflicted by Sandino’s 
forces, the United States ultimately removed the marines in 1933. A year later, the head 
of the National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, assassinated Sandino and destroyed his 
army, and in 1936 established himself as a military dictator.   
The Somoza dynasty was entirely backed by the United States and lasted from 
1936 until 1979, with Anastasio Somoza Garcia handing down power to his eldest son 
Luis Somoza Debayle who was then succeeded by his younger brother, Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle. The three dictators were infamous for their corruption and heavy-
handed repression, but it was only after the 1972 earthquake, which destroyed most of 
Managua, that Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s power began to be contested. After the 
earthquake, Somoza used most of the relief funds donated to Nicaragua to build luxury 
homes for himself and his National Guardsmen instead of to rebuild houses for the poor. 
Business people also became frustrated with Somoza’s tight monopolies on 
reconstruction industries that would not allow for market competition. As time went on 
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and discontent grew, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN), which was founded in 1961 on the liberation ideology 
of Sandino, became increasingly more powerful. Furthermore, the National Guard’s 
severe repression of civilians believed to be working with the Sandinistas caused the 
Catholic Church to discontinue their support of Somoza. After Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, 
the outspoken editor of the Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa, was killed in 1978 and 
U.S. reporter Bill Stewart was killed in 1979, both by the National Guard, President 
Jimmy Carter decided to withdraw United States support of Somoza, which led to 
Somoza’s defeat just a few months later.4 
After the FSLN came to power through a provisional 7-person junta government, 
the Sandinistas began to enact social programs aimed at helping the poverty stricken 
population. In 1980, they organized a national literacy crusade in which 30,000 university 
students from the cities when to rural areas of the country to teach adults and children, 
allegedly reducing illiteracy in the country from 52% to 12% in 8 months.5 The 
Sandinistas also introduced a language of rights into law, including the freedom of 
expression, personal security, and women’s rights, as well as providing universal 
healthcare and establishing a national labor code. As part of their economic plan, the 
Sandinistas expropriated land from certain relatively wealthy farm owners to redistribute 
it to campesinos, poor agricultural farmers, whom they organized into government-
controlled cooperatives. Less favorably, they also limited the media and repressed anti-
Sandinista sentiment throughout the country in an attempt to unify Nicaragua under a 
single revolutionary government. The FSLN was heavily supported by the Soviet Union 
                                                        
4
 Aynn Setright: The Revolution of the 1980s and 90s. 26 February 2012. Managua, Nicaragua 
5
 Aynn Setright: The Revolution of the 1980s and 90s. 26 February 2012. Managua, Nicaragua 
 10
and Cuba at the time, especially after the United States placed an embargo on Nicaragua 
in 1985, which curtailed all trade between the two countries.  
Beginning in 1981, the counterrevolutionary forces, or the Contra (also called La 
Resistencia) began to organize in response to unfavorable Sandinista policies. This 
coincided with the 1981 election of President Reagan, a staunch believer in the global 
threat of Communism to the “free world.” Thus, noting the socialist bent of the FSLN 
government, the United States began funding the Contra forces, slowly increasing aid 
throughout the 1980s. In order to respond to what they perceived as continued United 
States aggression against Nicaragua through neocolonialist economic policy and proxy 
troops, the Sandinistas spent much of the national budget on defense and eventually 
instituted a draft of boys from age 16 into the Sandinista People’s Army, which became 
increasingly unpopular among the Nicaraguan population.  
 
Cold War History 
“It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that 
we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world.” 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North,  
Director of the National Security Council’s Counterterrorism and Low-Intensity Warfare Group,  
at the Joint House-Senate Select Committee on Iran and the Contras in July 19876 
 
After the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the two major world superpowers 
emerged as the once-allied United States and Soviet Union. Despite their cooperation 
during the world war, the two countries’ economic and political differences led them to 
develop separate spheres of influence that polarized most of the world into a fight 
between the seemingly opposing ideologies of Capitalism and Communism. The United 
                                                        
6
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 4 
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States and the powerful Western European countries created a military alliance through 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the Soviet Union formed the 
Warsaw Pact and established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
among the Eastern Bloc of communist countries in Eastern Europe.  
A significant aspect of the struggle for power and ultimate economic and political 
hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union was the competition for 
control over “Third World” countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia 
throughout the mid-1900s until 1991. President Harry S. Truman, in his Inaugural 
Address on January 20, 1949, introduced the new “Point Four Program” using 
humanitarian terms. He asserted that the program would “provide technical assistance to 
poor peoples in the ‘underdeveloped areas’ whose ‘economic life is primitive and 
stagnant.’ The President extolled self-help, the expansion of private foreign investment, 
and greater production to achieve ‘prosperity and peace.’”7 During this particularly 
volatile time, both the United States and the Soviet Union interpreted internal national 
revolutions as proxy battlegrounds for their own international ideological war. 
The United States under President Ronald Reagan was convinced of its obligation 
to fight Communism in Central America, as it was believed that Communist victories 
would disrupt the established world order and undermine the power of the United States. 
According to President Reagan,  
“The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. 
If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail 
elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, 
                                                        
7
 Thomas G. Paterson. Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988. Page 147. 
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and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy. We have a vital 
interest, a moral duty, and solemn responsibility…”8 
United States foreign policy in Central America the 1980s, therefore, was fully focused 
on curbing the Communist threat so as to stem the feared “domino effect” of states falling 
to Communism after their neighbors turned Communist. Thus, the United States did not 
view domestic revolutionary movements as emanating from historical frustrations or 
national aspirations; rather, they were contextualized in the simple dichotomous story of 
pro- or anti-United States. The Department of State and the Department of Defense’s 
1986 publication, “The Challenge to Democracy in Central America,” outlines the United 
States government’s mentality during the 1980s regarding Central America’s role in the 
Cold War:  
“The people of [Central America] are facing the loss of their freedom if 
their governments fall to Communist-backed guerrillas attempting to seize 
power. The United States is also facing a threat to its security and 
economic well-being as a result of Soviet expansionism. The strategic goal 
of the Soviet Union is to force the United States to divert political 
attention and military resources to its critical Southern Flank, and away 
from areas of the world vital to the Soviets. To achieve this goal, the 
Soviets and their proxies, Cuba and Nicaragua, are arming, training, and 
                                                        
8
 President Ronal Reagan before Joint Session of Congress, April 1983. “The Challenge to Democracy in 
Central America,” Department of State and Department of Defense, 2nd printing. October, 1986. 
Washington, DC. Page 1 
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increasingly controlling Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, most notably in El 
Salvador, but in other Central American countries as well…”9 
The United States viewed Nicaragua in particular as a great potential threat to the 
stability of the entire Central American region. The Reagan Administration viewed 
Nicaragua as “a betrayed revolution—a country on the Soviet Union’s ‘hit-list’…that had 
gone ‘Communist.’”10 According to “The Challenge to Democracy in Central America,” 
the Soviets gave more than $600 million to Nicaragua in “war-making material” and 
more than $4 billion to Cuba in “jet fighters, tanks, warships, surface-to-air missiles, and 
other tools of war,” not including the cost of training, since 1980.11 In comparison, the 
United States had given only $1 billion in military assistance and training to all of Central 
America during the same period. Thus, the Unites States claimed, “militarization of the 
region can…be traced to Moscow, not Washington.”12  
It is in that atmosphere of acute fear of losing its position of hegemony in a 
politically and economically polarized world that the United States began to fund the 
counterrevolutionary guerrilla forces, or the Contra, in Nicaragua in 1981 against the 
Soviet-backed Sandinista government.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9
 “The Challenge to Democracy in Central America,” Department of State and Department of Defense, 2nd 
printing. October, 1986. Washington, DC. Page 1 
10
 Thomas G. Paterson. Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan. Page 257 
11
 “The Challenge to Democracy in Central America,” Department of State and Department of Defense, 2nd 
printing. October, 1986. Washington, DC. Page 3 
12
 “The Challenge to Democracy in Central America,” Department of State and Department of Defense, 2nd 
printing. October, 1986. Washington, DC. Page 3 
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Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) 
United States Strategy 
In the Cold War climate of the 1980s, especially during the Reagan 
Administration, the United States adopted a new military strategy called “Low Intensity 
Conflict” (LIC) to contain the spreading threat of Communism. The 1986 Joint Low-
Intensity Conflict Project Final Report defines LIC strategy as “diplomatic, economic, 
and military support for either a government under attack by insurgents or an insurgent 
force seeking freedom from an adversary government.”13 The nomenclature of “Low 
Intensity Conflict” comes from a theoretical “spectrum of conflict” that defines “low” 
levels of conflict as “guerrilla wars and other limited conflicts fought with irregular 
units,” “medium” levels as “regional wars fought with modern weapons,” and “high” 
levels as “a global nonnuclear conflagration or a nuclear engagement.”14 LIC is different 
from past U.S. military tactics in that it does not only consist of regular military 
operations, but also involves “the coordinated integration of economic assistance with 
psychological operations and security measures”15 designed to destabilize Socialist-
leaning governments and guerrilla forces. According to Michael T. Klare and Peter 
Kornbluh,  
“LIC begins with counterinsurgency, and extends to a wide variety of 
other politicomilitary operations, both over and covert…” that “represents 
a strategic reorientation of the U.S. military establishment, and a renewed 
                                                        
13
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 7 
14
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 6-7 
15
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 6 
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commitment to employ force in a global crusade against Third World 
revolutionary movements and governments.” 16 
The United States viewed the Soviet Union as exploiting economic and political 
instability in “Third World Countries” in order to challenge U.S. hegemony and 
compromise its access to natural resources and strategic economic markets. Thus, U.S. 
military strategists perceived that the war against the Soviet Union was really manifested 
in many smaller battles on the soil of less developed countries as opposed to in Europe, 
thereby requiring the U.S. to undermine any and all perceived allies of the USSR abroad.  
In 1987, President Reagan institutionalized Low Intensity Conflict as the primary 
national military strategy by establishing a “Board for Low Intensity Conflict” within the 
National Security Council and signing a classified National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) 277.17 The NSDD’s stated objective was to “promulgate a national policy and 
strategy for Low Intensity Conflict, identify resources for implementing the strategy, and 
define a consistent and lasting approach for interagency planning and coordination.”18 
The directive also outlined U.S. strategy for supporting insurgency resistance fources, 
which included “taking advantage of selected resistance movements to gain leverage 
against hostile regimes,” “avoiding ‘Americanizing’ resistance movements” so they do 
not “become permanently dependent on external support,” and “conveying to movements 
and their adversaries that the U.S. has a long-term commitment to achieving a favorable 
outcome.”19  
                                                        
16
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 3 
17
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 6 
18
 National Security Decision Directive Number 277: National Policy and Strategy for Low Intensity 
Conflict. June 15, 1987. Page 1. See Appendix for full NSDD report. 
19
 National Security Decision Directive Number 277: National Policy and Strategy for Low Intensity 
Conflict. June 15, 1987. Page 5 
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After the Vietnam War in the 1960s, public opinion in the United States became 
exceedingly anti-interventionist given the magnitude of losses incurred. In the wake of 
the war, congressional oversight of the CIA was legislated and the “Wars Powers Act” 
was passed, which prohibited future presidents from deploying U.S. troops abroad for 
extended periods of time without congressional approval.20 The public was no longer 
willing to risk American lives or to commit huge portions of their tax dollars to conflicts 
overseas. For that reason, the strategy of Low Intensity Conflict allowed the Reagan 
administration to “wage a war not defined as such. No draft would be necessary; few 
soldiers would be deployed, and even fewer would be sent home in body bags.”21 Thus, 
LIC became a means by which the United States could intervene abroad without being 
forced to cope with the negative consequences of employing U.S. troops, which would 
undoubtedly have fostered greater opposition at home.  
 
Contra Perceptions of LIC 
Most of the individuals whom I interviewed, despite having been directly trained 
by the United States and/or having served as commanders in the Contra army, did not 
recognize the term Low Intensity Conflict (or its Spanish equivalent: “Guerra de Baja 
Intensidad”). Of those who did, some surmised that it was connected to the Cold War in 
which the United States needed to fight to keep the Soviets away from its border,22 while 
others asserted that LIC was a psychological strategy employed by the Soviets to control 
Nicaragua and the rest of Central America.23 Former Contra Noel Vardez, nom de guerre 
                                                        
20
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 13 
21
 Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare. Page 9 
22
 Germán Zeledón (nom de guerre “El Enano”). Interview on April 25, 2012. Jinotega, Nicaragua. 
23
 Roberto Petray. Interview on April 23, 2012. Esteli, Nicaragua. 
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“Comandante Brack,” identified LIC as the tactic used during the Cold War by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union to control territories that would be strategically 
beneficial to spreading their respective ideologies.24 The Democratic Revolutionary 
Alliance (ARDE) leader, Edén Pastora, more precisely recognized LIC as the “strategy of 
the United States to obligate the Frente [Sandinista] to negotiate with them.”25 Edén 
observed that the United States never gave the Contras sufficient arms to achieve a 
military victory; rather, it sustained the Contras’ fight just enough to pressure the 
Sandinista government to negotiate. In that way, the United States could obtain the 
political control it desired to assert a “democratic,” anti-Communist system in Nicaragua. 
Many former Contras I interviewed claimed that their ultimate goal was a complete 
military victory over the Sandinistas, but that the United States was more interested in 
negotiating with the government for political influence. 
 
The Contra Identity 
La Resistencia Nicaragüense, or the Contra army, was comprised of numerous 
diverse groups of individuals who harbored unique grievances against the Sandinistas and 
maintained distinct economic and political ideologies, yet were united in their opposition 
to the revolutionary government that took control of the country in 1979 after Somoza’s 
overthrow. As a complete account of every Contra faction would be an exhaustive project 
and could merit an entire book in and of itself, I will examine only the three largest 
groups that composed the armed counterrevolutionary movement: (1) The Democratic 
Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática, ARDE); (2) Yapti Tasba 
                                                        
24
 Noel Vardez (nom de guerre “Brack”). Interview on April 26, 2012. Matagalpa, Nicaragua. 
25
 Edén Pastora Gomez (nom de guerre “Comandante Cero”). Interview on May 3, 2012. Managua, 
Nicaragua. Translation by author. 
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Masraka Nanih Asla Takanka (YATAMA, literally "Organization of the Nations of 
Mother Earth"); and (3) The Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática 
Nicaragüense, FDN).  
 
The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) 
 Formed under the command of former Sandinista Edén Pastora Gómez at the end 
of 1982, ARDE fought the Sandinistas on the southern front of Nicaragua with 
approximately 6,000 soldiers. The ranks were comprised of Pacific lowlanders who were 
“mostly rural peasants or urban workers of Pacific lowland origin…who had been moved 
in the 1930s to the region of Nueva Guinea in the Atlantic lowlands.” 26 The leaders of 
ARDE were upper and middle class intellectuals who maintained leftist social and 
economic ideologies that differed greatly from those of the majority of FDN leaders. 
Despite attempts to unify under a single headquarters, “the ethnic, historical, geographic, 
and social differences between the FDN and the Southern Front were simply too deep to 
be bridged,”27 for ARDE fighters did not identify as counterrevolutionary “Contra,” but 
rather as pro-revolutionary anti-Sandinistas. ARDE received a total of $1 million in 
military and humanitarian aid from the CIA from 1982 until 1984, as well as support 
from Panama and individuals in Venezuela and Mexico. Pastora claimed that although he 
was sent funds by the United States, he did not make any commitment to forge a political 
alliance; rather, he maintained a “love-hate relationship” with the CIA because he was 
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using them to fund his fight against the Sandinista government while they were using him 
to fight their proxy war against the Soviets.28  
Motivations 
According to Pastora, ARDE fought to defend true Sandinismo against the 
perversions of the revolutionary Sandinista government that was moving away from 
Socialism and toward “Stalinism.”29 He observed that the Sandinistas were violating 
human rights, most significantly freedom of the press and the liberty to organize 
politically. Furthermore, Pastora contended that the Sandinistas should not have made 
political commitments to the Soviets after the revolution, whereby forming a dangerous 
alliance during the Cold War. Instead, he maintained that the Sandinista government 
could have relied solely on support from countries like Italy, Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Panama, and Colombia. In order to realize his goal of instituting “changes in liberty and 
democracy” in the government, Pastora saw three options: first, attempt to make the 
Sandinistas understand his position; second, to allow the FDN to take over the south 
where he was convinced “they would kill everyone”; or third, to fight the Sandinistas 
militarily with help from the United States. Since Edén perceived no space for a non-
violent, civil battle with the Sandinistas, he felt that his only viable option was to 
assemble his own army and fight.30 
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Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka (YATAMA) 
 YATAMA was the 5,000-person counterrevolutionary movement on the Atlantic 
Coast of Nicaragua, which was largely comprised of the indigenous Miskito, Sumo, and 
Rama people. They fought mostly in northern Zelaya (present-day Región Atonoma 
Atlantico Norte, or RAAN) as well as in a few communities in southern parts of the 
Caribbean Coast. YATAMA was originally developed from the pro-Sandinista 
organization called Miskitos, Sumus, Ramas, Sandinistas Working Together 
(MISURASATA),31 which was created in 1979 to replace the indigenous organization, 
Alliance for the Progress of the Miskito and Sumu Peoples (ALPROMISU),32 to work 
with the new Sandinista government on indigenous issues.33 The three leaders of 
MISURASATA, Stedman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, and Hazel Lau, were all Miskito 
community leaders. In January 1981, Fagoth declared “open political war” on the 
Sandinistas and enlisted the support of young Moskito men, as well as Miskito community 
pastors for his guerrilla movement, which he named MISURA.34 Later that same year, 
Rivera formed his own Moskito military organization comprised of many MISURA 
dissidents, which he continued to call MISURASATA.35 By mid-1983, despite animosity 
between Rivera and Fagoth, the fighters in MISURA and MISURASATA felt, “we were 
fighting for our people, not for leaders, so that here in the mountains we were going to 
unite both forces in one single struggle.”36 In June 1987, the U.S. State Department 
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formally unified the indigenous forces fighting on the Atlantic Coast into YATAMA, 
which later became the indigenous political party in 1990.37  
Motivations 
In January and February 1982, Sandinistas unexpectedly evacuated 20,000 
Moskitos living in Rio Coco in the Northern Atlantic Coast and militarized the border 
with Honduras in an attempt to prevent MISURA from establishing a base inside 
Nicaragua. The villagers’ homes and animals were destroyed and they could only carry 
few possessions with them to their new territory. Moreover, they were relocated to land 
that was geographically different from their previous homes, which made survival 
difficult.38 This event became known as “Red Christmas” (Navidad Roja) and served as a 
justification for Moskito participation in the Contra forces against the Sandinistas.  
According to former Contras living in the southern coastal Moskito community of 
Kakabila, however, their primary motivation for fighting the Sandinistas was to gain 
“autonomy.”  
Johnny Hodgsone,39 the leader of the committee of community representatives 
that was tasked with defining indigenous aspirations for coastal autonomy, claimed that 
once the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, they made a commitment that Moskito 
people would be fully incorporated in the construction of the “new Nicaragua.” 
Sandinistas went to Moskito communities to learn about the communities’ problems and 
found that the Moskitos wanted equality in Nicaragua and the ability to elect their own 
coastal government. The Sandinistas therefore agreed that if the people of the Atlantic 
Coast created a proposal for autonomy, they would negotiate new legislation. Hodgsone’s 
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committee eventually was able to distill numerous diverse versions of autonomy into just 
two different concepts: “indigenous autonomy,” and “intercultural autonomy.” According 
to Johnny, the proponents of indigenous autonomy fought with the Contras to advance 
their position, while the proponents of intercultural autonomy fought with the 
Sandinistas.40  
 Former Contras in Kakabila articulated their rationale for fighting in less nuanced 
terms, however. For example, Paul Swartz, a coconut farmer and former Contra, 
explained that he decided to fight because he wanted “autonomy” for his community, 
despite the fact that it required him to fight against people in his own town.41 When I 
asked him specifically about indigenous versus intercultural autonomy, he did not seem 
to recognize either term. Paul’s general responses indicated that he had decided to fight 
with the Contras because he felt that the Sandinistas were not working toward developing 
coastal autonomy, though he asserted that he stopped fighting once he realized the 
damage the violence was causing in Kakabila.    
Jasper Theodore Swartz, 42 a current member of the territorial government of 
Kakabila and the Kakabila community judge, asserted that Brooklyn Rivera fought 
vehemently against the Sandinistas for the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast and compelled 
Ortega to promise to grant coastal autonomy when the war ended by enforcing Law 445, 
which states that “Moskitos should have the right to administrate what is theirs.”43 Jasper 
explained that in 1905 the Harrison-Altamirano treaty gave the indigenous communities 
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the title to their land so that they could administer it as they desired. Since the Moskito 
people spoke their own distinct language and had their own culture and history, not to 
mention a unique legal right to the land, they did not identify with Crioles or Garifuna 
who were not entirely indigenous to the Atlantic Coast. In this respect, many Moskitos 
fought for their own community’s control over coastal territory rather than for combined 
control by all ethnic communities since they believed that they maintained a more 
significant claim to the land, despite not using the term “indigenous autonomy” to 
describe their aspiration.  
Jasper, however, claimed that most Contras on the coast did not have a clear 
understanding of why they were fighting, for they were only acting on their perception 
that that the Sandinistas in power still had not granted them autonomy after the 
revolution. Regardless, their goals were completely separate from those of the FDN who 
were fighting against the national threat of Communism and ineffective Sandinista 
policies that affected campesinos on the Pacific Coast.  
Antonio Hodgsone, another former Contra soldier from Kakabila, provided a 
different perspective than that of Jasper in many respects.44 He began by explaining his 
objective for fighting as aspiring “to have autonomy as a Miskito nation” because he 
believed that once the Spaniards came to Moskitia, the Moskito people’s rights were 
limited severely from when they lived under a king. He claimed that Somoza did not 
provide access to education or adequate medical care and instead exploited the coast’s 
natural resources (their “richness”) so that the Moskito communities did not see any of 
the profit. The Moskitos therefore took up arms against Somoza and won, only to fight 
again against the Sandinistas whom they viewed as similarly exploiting their resources. 
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According to Antonio, the Moskitos joined the Contra forces “to administrate what is 
ours,” while he contended that those who joined the Sandinistas were poorly educated 
and were therefore susceptible to propaganda. Antonio claimed that YATAMA was 
fighting for the autonomy of everyone on the coast, as opposed to only for the indigenous 
communities, and that his Contra army was fighting a completely separate war from that 
of the FDN on the Pacific Coast. He said that soldiers in the FDN “were fighting for I 
don’t know what… to take over the Ortega government,” and that they never even went 
to the coast to fight.45  
In truth, it seems that the only similarity between YATAMA and the FDN was 
that they were both fighting against the sitting Sandinista government in some fashion, 
for the Sandinista policies with which they disagreed were entirely distinct.   
 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) 
The FDN was the largest Contra army fighting on the Pacific Coast, eventually 
numbering approximately 24,000 soldiers at the time of disarmament in 1990.46 It was 
created in 1981 with the unification of ex-National Guardsmen with former Sandinista 
supporters from the campo. Many campesinos had previously joined the Sandinistas’ 
fight against the Somoza dictatorship, participating through small guerrilla groups called 
the People’s Anti-Somoza Militias (Militias Populares Anti-Somocistas, MILPAS); 
however, soon after the Sandinistas took over the government, many campesinos became 
disillusioned by revolutionary policies and decided to fight against the government, 
changing the MILPAS acronym to stand for the People’s Anti-Sandinista Militias 
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(Militias Populares Anti-Sandinistas).47 Former Guardia soldiers who had been exiled 
after the fall of Somoza began to organize in parts of Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
and, most notably, in Guatemala as the September 15 Legion (Legión 15 de Septiembre) 
in 1979.48 The FDN was mostly active in the north of Nicaragua, especially around the 
border with Honduras, while some ex-Guardia Contra troops fought in the south near 
Costa Rica as well. By the end of the war, it was found that between 8,500 and 10,500 
FDN Comandos were killed in battle and that all together, about 45,000-50,000 
Nicaraguans had fought with the FDN at some time during the 1980s.49 Amid widespread 
rumors that the Contra were forcing people to fight in the army, the United States 
contracted a professional sociologist to investigate the veracity of the claim. He 
ultimately found “no evidence of forced recruitment,”50 though granted his investigation 
served the interests of the U.S. government, as opposed to an independent organization. 
Furthermore, according to the Organization of American States’ (OAS) International 
Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV), the FDN was comprised of 97% 
campesinos, 64% of whom had no formal schooling, and only 1% former Guardia.51 In 
speaking to former Contra fighters, I learned that many soldiers were in their early teens, 
some even as young as 12 years old, when they first joined La Resistencia.   
When I asked my interviewees about the relationship between ex-Guardia and 
campesino soldiers in the FDN, I received varying responses. Some told me that their 
rapport was fairly calm and that they were all fighting for the same ideal of improving the 
country, while others told me that they did not get along at all. Although being the 
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minority, the ex-Guardia occupied most of the leadership positions since they had more 
military experience and the campesinos recognized the need for organized military 
training. According to many interviewees, most ex-Guardia soldiers came from families 
with poor campo roots, so they easily shared the same ideology as the campesino 
soldiers.52 Despite their apparent unity, however, most ex-Guardia had been removed 
from the FDN by 1988, for the United States and the Nicaraguan Contra leadership were 
looking to construct a “pueblo” image of campesinos fighting for their rights against a 
government they once supported.53 Even as early as 1982, ex-Guardia fighters were being 
taken out of FDN troop pictures because of the image they wanted to “sell to the 
Americans.”54 Furthermore, former Contra, Comandante Johnson, claimed that ex-
Guardia soldiers were particularly violent against the civilian population, which offended 
the campesino soldiers who were trying to “liberate Nicaragua.” This difference in 
behavior also contributed to the ex-Guardia being almost entirely phased out of the 
FDN.55 
Motivations 
As former Contra Noel Valdez explained, the Contras had “20,000 different 
reasons to fight.” 56 They were a reactionary group without a clear ideology of their own 
that was unified only in their desire to “liberate Nicaragua” from what they perceived to 
be a restrictive revolutionary government.57  
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Personal Grievances 
Some Contras decided to fight as reactions to their experiences of having been 
personally targeted by the Sandinistas after Somoza’s fall. Once they assumed power, the 
Sandinistas attempted to purge the country of all “Somocistas,” which came to include 
anyone who had at any time worked even peripherally with the government. Comandante 
Rubén’s father, for instance, had held a position in a community government and 
consequently had his land confiscated.58 Similarly, Germán Zeledón’s father, who had 
been in Somoza’s National Guard until he decided to leave in 1972, was killed by the 
Sandinistas in 1979 for his previous participation.59  
Communist Threat 
Other Contras were predominantly worried about the Communist ideology 
coming to define the political and economic policy of Nicaragua, which they believed 
would be detrimental to the development of the country. They felt that participating in the 
free market was necessary to promote economic growth and that democracy was severely 
lacking in civil society. Others viewed Communism as a foreign ideology that was 
limiting the autonomy of Nicaragua after Nicaraguans had struggled to determine their 
own political future just a few years before. They viewed the Sandinistas’ acceptance of 
monetary and material aid from the Soviet Union as an affront to their sovereignty and 
they desired to govern their own affairs independent of foreign influence.  
Poor Governmental Policy 
Nearly all of the former Contras I interviewed also cited ineffective Sandinista 
policies as contributing to their motivations for fighting. They spoke about the Sanidnista 
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decision to confiscate the property of hacienda owners with the intention of redistributing 
it to poor campesinos as being detrimental in practice. Noel Valdez, for example, asserted 
that the Sandinistas had taken away land from his parents who had worked hard for many 
years to buy the property, in order to give it to Sandinista “militares.”60 Former Contra, 
Doctor Mora, claimed that the Sandinistas “took out one poor person to replace with 
another poor person.”61 Many interviewees contended that the Sandinistas would 
specifically take the land of campesinos they had identified as being “anti-Sandinista,” 
which at the time automatically labeled them as Contras. Campesino farmers were also 
bothered by the cool, elitist attitude of the young revolutionaries who were put in charge 
of creating agricultural policy without demonstrating any understanding of campo life.62 
The government would confiscate land from larger ranchers and physically remove the 
tenants from the land on which they had previously worked to relocate them to state-run 
cooperative farms where they were made to work collectively under the direction of the 
Sandinistas. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform did not provide farmers with much better 
pay or with greater opportunities than the patrones had beforehand, and the inexperienced 
Sandinista managers allowed farms to fall into disrepair despite the land “belonging” to 
the farmers. Furthermore, even when land was successfully given to poor campesinos, 
they were unable to procure agricultural equipment, quality seeds, or crop loans if they 
did not present membership credentials in a Sandinista cooperative. 63  
 
 
                                                        
60
 Noel Vardez (nom de guerre “Brack”). Interview on April 26, 2012. Matagalpa, Nicaragua. 
61
 Pedro Jose Mora Zapata (nom de guerre “Doctor Orlando”), or Doctor Mora. Interview on April 24, 
2012. Esteli, Nicaragua. 
62
 Sam Dillon. Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua's Contra Rebels. New York: H. Holt, 1991. Page 47 
63
 Sam Dillon. Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua's Contra Rebels. New York: H. Holt, 1991. Page 48 
 29
Overwhelming Governmental Control 
Despite all of the Contras’ aforementioned complaints, the greatest grievance was 
their perception that the Sandinistas had shed their original revolutionary ideals and 
instead had begun to form an all-controlling, anti-democratic system of governance. 
Róger Espinoza Coronel asserted that he felt that the Sandinistas “wanted people to 
become robots” so that there would be no political dissention among the population.64 To 
their understanding, there was no freedom of the press and no liberty to organize 
politically against the Sandinistas; anyone who attempted to speak out against the 
government would be threatened, imprisoned, disappeared, or assassinated. Campesinos 
who had no affiliation with the Contras would be kept in Sandinista prisons for months, 
often suffering from hunger, torture, and unsanitary living conditions and ultimately 
dying in prison or shortly after their release from tuberculosis, stomach cancer, or 
hemorrhages from beatings.65 Although political debate within various sectors of civil 
society was initially encouraged as the revolution gathered momentum throughout the 
1970s, after 1979 those who criticized government policies were bluntly considered anti-
Sandinista and anti-revolutionary. For example, Mercedes Fley, who organized a group 
called Mothers of Political Prisoners, participated in a “Marcha de Dolor” (March of 
Pain) in 1986 that was forcefully broken up by armed Sandinistas.66 After participating in 
a similar protest in 1987 of women against the draft, which suffered severe repression by 
Sandinista authorities, Azucena Ferrey was moved to accept a position in the Contra 
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political directorate.67 Neighborhoods too became dangerous for political dissidents. The 
Sandinista Defense Committee (CDS), which was once a forum for community 
participation, became the “eyes and ears of the revolution” so that Sandinista supporters 
came to report their “anti-Sandinista” neighbors to governmental authorities.68 
Interviewees also spoke about the long lines outside of stores and the sparse ration cards 
required to obtain basic necessities like food and toiletries, as well as the mandatory 
military service for boys from 16 years old as further examples of the Sandinistas’ 
assertion of total societal control. Boys at the time were afraid to leave their houses for 
fear of being forced into the Sandinista army, eventually choosing to fight for the Contras 
voluntarily instead of waiting until the Sandinistas came to take them away.  
 
Intra-Contra Relationships 
The three major resistance armies, ARDE, YATAMA, and the FDN maintained 
fairly distinct ideologies and therefore acted autonomously from one another, despite all 
being coordinated to some extent by the United States. The former FDN Contras whom I 
asked about the relationship between the three armies believed that the groups, while 
being culturally diverse, were all fighting for the same general goal of liberating 
Nicaragua and overthrowing Communism to bring democracy to their country. They 
acknowledged that they had little, if any, contact with the other groups, but they were 
convinced that they had support for their fight in all parts of the country. FDN 
Comandante Johnson claimed that the FDN was on good terms with YATAMA and 
maintained friendly relations with ARDE soldiers on the ground, but that FDN leaders 
                                                        
67
 Azucena Ferrey. Interview on May 1, 2012. Managua, Nicaragua. 
68
 Envio, “CDS: Revolution in the Barrio.” Number 98, September 1989. 
<http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2738> 
 31
did not get along with ARDE commander Edén Pastora.69 Pastora, for his part, asserted 
that he had no relations with the FDN or with Stedman Fagoth’s MISURA forces, and 
only little contact with Brooklyn Rivera’s MISURASATA army, which he viewed as 
being more ideologically akin to his own group.70  
 
Who’s War Was It Anyway? 
United States Funding 
In 1981, President Reagan authorized the CIA to begin covert operations in 
Nicaragua for which he allocated $19.9 million to build a 500-man “action team” to 
undertake paramilitary activities.71 The United States gave increasing amounts of aid to 
the Contras through 1983 until Congress cut funding in 1984 after the CIA’s secret 
mining of Nicaraguan harbors and prohibited the CIA from being involved in the war 
more extensively than solely providing intelligence information to the Contras. In the 
absence of congressional funds, Oliver North established a clandestine support network 
for the Contras with the help of the Reagan administration, procuring more than $32 
million in secret funding for the FDN by arranging for the Saudi Arabian government to 
deposit funds into the private bank accounts of Contra political leaders.72 After Daniel 
Ortega traveled to Moscow in June 1985 to ask the Soviets for more aid, the U.S. House 
of Representatives appropriated $27 million in humanitarian aid to the Contras.73 Despite 
great concerns of human rights abuses by the Contra, the House was ultimately convinced 
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to approve $100 million in funding to the Contras in June 1986, $70 million of which was 
allocated to weaponry and, to appease Congress’s worries, $3 million was to go to human 
rights training. This plan allowed the CIA to again work directly with the Contras to plan 
strategy and conduct military operations.74 The “$100 million offensive” sustained the 
Contras through the beginning of 1988, when the Reagan administration unsuccessfully 
went back to Congress to ask for more funds in February. In March 1988, Congress 
approved $17.7 million to the Contras solely for food, clothing, and other survival 
supplies. A month later, the State Department’s Agency for International Development 
(AID) took over administration of the Contras from the CIA, turning the once secret 
program public.75 Despite being legally prohibited from continuing relations with the 
Contra forces, the CIA continued to fund the army until 1990 and the political directorate 
until July 1989.76    
 
Contra Perceptions of the United States 
Of the former FDN Contras I interviewed, nearly all of them asserted that the 
United States was not giving the Contras very much aid and that the majority of the funds 
they received was allocated to “humanitarian” purposes. They claimed that U.S. 
assistance went mostly to food, medicine, uniforms, boots, training, and recruitment for 
the Contra troops, and even to food, medicine, agricultural supplies, and seeds for the 
civilian population. Families of Contra soldiers that had fled to Honduras for fear of 
being killed by the Sandinistas also were given monetary and material assistance. Most of 
my interviewees admitted that the United States also provided weapons, helicopters, and 
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advanced military technology to the army, but they all maintained that it was never 
enough to achieve a military victory.  
It seemed that a common sentiment among interviewees was that the war was an 
entirely Nicaraguan conflict that required monetary support from whatever source was 
willing to provide it. They firmly believed in the necessity to “liberate Nicaragua” from 
the repressive Soviet-backed Sandinista government and were therefore keen on aligning 
with the sympathetic United States. Many interviewees recognized that they were part of 
the larger international fight between Communism and Democracy,77 but they maintained 
that their motivations for fighting were much more domestic-focused. Thus, the United 
States was not entirely “using” the Contras to fight their own war against the Soviet 
Union; rather, the relationship between the United States and the Contras was more of a 
confluence of interests in which both groups wanted to depose the Sandinistas but for 
different reasons. As Azucena Ferrey aptly articulated the Contra War dynamic, “the 
arms were the United States’ and the Soviets’, but the dead were ours.”78 
 
Moral Considerations 
In this section I will focus only on the FDN portion of the Contra forces since it 
was the largest faction of La Resistencia and was most heavily funded by the United 
States. I am aware of some human rights considerations taken by ARDE and YATAMA, 
but my interviews of fighters associated with those armies did not yield sufficient 
information about the subject to warrant inclusion in this section.  
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In attempting to assess the moral role of the United States in funding the Contra 
army, I became interested in investigating the human rights-related concerns of military 
strategists and policymakers in the United States and military authorities in Nicaragua. 
The Contras were believed in Nicaragua, as well as in the United States, to be frequent 
human rights violators, with numerous reports from independent sources of individual 
civilian murders and full town massacres. In 1985, for example, U.S. lawyer Reed Brody 
compiled evidence of 28 different instances of Contra violence against civilians, which 
he separated by type of violence, including: attacks on coffee pickers, attacks on farms 
and villages, attacks on civilian vehicles, kidnappings, and rapes.79 Additionally, the U.S. 
Congress was wary of funding the Contras because of the army’s poor human rights 
record.80 Many former Contras whom I interviewed, however, claimed that the Sandinista 
government spread much propaganda about Contra abuses so that the civilian population 
would not support them, when in reality the FDN soldiers were just simple, idealistic 
campesinos. According to Comandante Johnson, human rights were only taken into 
consideration beginning in 1986 when the United States allocated funding to that 
purpose; beforehand, Contra troops “fought freely” without any restrictions from written 
codes of conduct, formal classes, or a military justice tribunal.81 
 
United States Legal Policy 
In terms of U.S. policy, a human rights consideration made by the United States 
was to place conditions on the aid they were giving the Contras. Nearly every person I 
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interviewed claimed that the United States required the Contras to respect the human 
rights of civilians and Sandinista prisoners in order to continue receiving monetary 
assistance. Furthermore, the U.S. State Department made a rule that individuals found to 
have violated human rights during the war were not allowed to reside in the United 
States. In practice, however, this statute was not completely enforced because of the 
constant infighting between the State Department, the Security Council, and the CIA.82 
 
Human Rights Classes 
The United States also had a policy to teach Contras about the necessity of 
protecting human rights through formal courses. Former Contra Germán Zeledón, who 
trained to be a commander at a U.S. military base in North Carolina in 1984, explained 
that part of the mandatory training for all soldiers was to attend “civismo” (“civic”) 
classes. These courses were focused on teaching about the Contra identity, reasons for 
fighting against the Sandinistas, the contemporary political situation, relations with the 
civil population, and human rights issues. Zeledón said that the United States instructors 
taught Contra troops to be organized, nicely dressed and well behaved in order to appear 
as good personal examples to inspire confidence in their forces among civilians.83  
 
Asociación Nicaragüense Pro-Derechos Humanos (ANPDH) 
Part of the $3 million set aside by the United States in 1986 for human rights 
issues went to the establishment of the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights 
(Asociación Nicaragüense Pro-Derechos Humanos, ANPDH). Assistance for the 
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organization also came from small North American human rights organizations and 
individuals concerned with the cause, an international committee from the European 
Union, and the international Red Cross, though it was run entirely by Nicaraguans. 
According to the executive director of the ANPDH, Roberto Petray, the organization was 
originally created to monitor Contra activity in the mountains and investigate alleged 
human rights abuses.84 Part of the work of the ANPDH, in addition to investigating 
reported Contra violations, was to train and place one soldier (called a “companía”) in 
every troop of 20 men to watch out for human rights abuses within the ranks.  
 
Code of Conduct 
According to Comandante Johnson, the first version of the Contra code of 
conduct, the Blue and White Book (El Libro Azul y Blanco), was written by a member of 
the political directorate of the FDN in 1983. The second version, the Combatant Manual 
(El Manuel del Combatiente),85 was written in 1985 by a former National Guard lawyer 
who had served under Somoza. Neither of these versions was distributed to troops until 
1986 when the ANPDH was established, at which point they were improved upon and 
then circulated in human rights training classes.86 The international Red Cross also 
contributed to the development of the human rights literature, which addressed issues 
such as the moral treatment of civilians and war prisoners. A few individuals with whom 
I spoke proudly asserted that the Contras were the first guerrilla movement in history to 
have a code of conduct at all. Former Contra Germán Zeledón explained that it was 
important to honor human rights for three main reasons: to show the Nicaraguan people 
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“that we were a legitimate force,” to show the international community that “the Contras 
are people who don’t violate human rights,” and to convince the United States Congress 
that it should continue sending aid.87 
 
Nicaraguan Legal Enforcement 
In order to enforce human rights regulations, the United States established a 
Nicaraguan-run15-person Contra legal office in 1986 to investigate the human rights 
“denunciations” about which the U.S. Congress learned.88 Part the project was also to 
create a military justice tribunal to investigate reports of abuses and to punish 
perpetrators appropriately. According to the president of the tribunal, Maximino 
Rodriguez, the U.S. organization America Watch worked closely with the tribunal to 
ensure that human rights were honored even in counterintelligence operations. He 
explained that if an individual was reported to have infringed on the rights of civilians or 
prisoners, the tribunal would analyze the veracity of the claim and the magnitude of 
damage done and would then respond by either monitoring, sanctioning, or expelling the 
abuser.89 Comandante Johnson, the Contra army’s chief legal prosecutor, explained that if 
the companía, the ANPDH accompanying soldier, discovered a violation among his 
troop, he would go to the head of the platoon (the “jefe”), who would then seek out 
Comandante Johnson in the Contra army’s legal office. If the violation were determined 
to be true, Comdandante Johnson would speak with the commander of the unit about a 
suitable punishment. In addition to monitoring or expelling the abuser, Comandante 
                                                        
87
 Germán Zeledón (nom de guerre “El Enano”). Interview on April 25, 2012. Jinotega, Nicaragua. 
Translations by author. 
88
 Luis Fley (nom de guerre “Comandante Johnson”). Interview on May 7, 2012. Managua, Nicaragua 
89
 Maximino Rodriguez (nom de guerre “Comandante Wilmer”). Interview on May 2, 2012. Managua, 
Nicaragua 
 38
Johnson asserted that the abuser could be transferred to a different location or, in extreme 
cases, imprisoned.90  
 
Difficulties in Practice 
Despite the Contras’ sincere attempts to teach and enforce rules of military 
engagement, war conditions predictably made adherence difficult and sometimes 
impossible. Comandante Rubén, for example, explained that fighting as a guerrilla army 
meant that the Contras did not have real prisons in which to hold captured Sandinistas, as 
was required by international laws of combat. Similarly, troops did not always have 
sufficient supplies to feed their prisoners for three to four days since they required the 
limited provisions for their own survival. Furthermore, Comandante Rubén asserted that 
many situations that presented themselves in reality were not addressed in the code of 
conduct, so commanders were forced to “improvise” their enforcement. He explained that 
he would often practice the unofficial policy of “dar de va,” (“let go”), allowing a 
prisoner to go free “so that he wouldn’t become an enemy.” 91 Róger Espinoza Coronel 
likewise expressed the difficulty of adhering strictly to a code of conduct in war 
situations because at the time all civilians were considered either Sandinistas or Contras, 
so soldiers were forced to quickly decide who was an ally and who constituted a potential 
threat. He also claimed that the campesinos in the FDN respected civilians’ human rights 
more than the ex-Guardia in the FDN because they were more familiar with the campo 
population. 92  
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Legal Repercussions on the United States 
In 1984, Nicaragua brought a case against the United States in the international 
Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua. In its judgment on June 27, 1986, the court found the United States in 
violation of numerous “customary international laws” and rejected the U.S. “justification 
of collective self-defense” concerning its actions in Nicaragua.  
Below are some of the key decisions made by the ICJ in its ruling:93 
(3) Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, 
financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and 
aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the 
Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not 
to intervene in the affairs of another State; 
(5) Decides that the United States of America, by directing or authorizing over 
Rights of Nicaraguan territory… has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach 
of its obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of 
another State; 
(6) Decides that, by laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the 
Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has 
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary 
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international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not 
to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce; 
(10) Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan 
territory… and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, 
has committed acts calculated to deprive of its object and purpose the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 
January 1956; 
(12) Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to 
cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal 
obligations; 
(13) Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make 
reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches 
of obligations under customary international law enumerated above; 
 
Final Reflections 
Over the course of my research, I have learned that when writing about history or 
politics or war, every word carries a bias. Asserting the truth of an event may either 
legitimize or delegitimize a movement, or even an entire ideology. Even “outsiders,” who 
have not lived the history about which they write, are partisan—they come with their own 
notions of how the world should work, of justices and injustices committed, and of 
tolerable and intolerable actions. Most of these biases, I believe, come from only 
seeing—or only focusing on—part of the larger story, yet our inability to see “the whole 
picture” is in turn limited by who we are. Our own lived experiences, whether 
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consciously chosen or not, form our modes of thinking and cause us to favor one 
perspective or another. Moreover, not only are there infinitely many parts to every story, 
but every individual part carries with it a unique combination of human truths, 
falsehoods, exaggerations, hopes, egos, and fears. 
So how can we decipher what is “truth” and what is “propaganda”? Are we to 
trust the many books published about the justice of the cause of each side, whose authors 
also write from within a particular bias? Are we to take at face value the pure, heartfelt 
stories of the soldiers who earnestly fought for the betterment of their society? 
Those of us on the “outside” have the privilege of analyzing various sides from a 
safe distance and are able to refrain from ascribing rightness or wrongness to any singular 
action. Although it may seem like a cop-out not to align with any group, I believe that 
greater intellectual progress can be made by recognizing the challenges present in each 
particular situation so that we may learn from those past dynamics.  
One particular lesson I have confronted throughout this research is the notion that 
nothing in this world—the physical realm—is perfect. As expressed through Plato’s 
forms in The Republic, things can only maintain their perfection in the realm of ideas. No 
theory or ideology once put into practice will ever be completely satisfactory, and people 
will always strive for something better. In actuality, even if one system is “working,” 
some people will be left out, will be relatively worse off than others, or will be 
dissatisfied for any number of reasons. The lack of practicable perfection inevitably 
allows room for improvement—a fact that may be exploited or exaggerated by naysayers 
who attempt to define an entire ideology by its imperfections. In the case of the Contra 
War, for example, many counterrevolutionaries came to identify all of the mistakes of the 
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Socialist-leaning revolutionary government with “Communism” without recognizing the 
problems of alternative systems as well.  In reality, however, every governmental and 
economic system is a mixture of details that are drawn from different, sometimes 
seemingly opposing, ideologies. 
In situations of violent conflict, such as war, the concept of “something better” is 
also at play. In war, regardless of how well rules of engagement are followed and how 
many precautions are taken to ensure the security of non-combatants, innocent people 
will die. Whether due to error, ill will, poor training, greed, or happenstance, civilians 
will suffer when arms are introduced into a population in conflict. The notion of 
“improvement” therefore allows for criticism of every army, for many argue that any 
military-inflicted civilian deaths render the army completely immoral or inhumane. Such 
demonizing of the opposition only serves to restrict dialogue between the parties in 
conflict who may each maintain legitimate concerns, such as in the example of the 
Contras concerning their perceptions of harmful governmental policy.    
In looking to the future, I believe that it is necessary to recognize the realities of 
war so that we do not immediately delegitimize the grievances of our opposition when we 
suffer civilian casualties. If armed forces do not feel heard, then we can never hope for a 
nonviolent resoltuion to the conflict. Furthermore, in striving to improve our eternally 
imperfect society, we must bear in mind that there will always be more work to do. Thus, 
instead of throwing out a broken system to replace it with different, yet equally 
problematic, system, it may be preferable to work to understand the points of inadequacy 
within the existing system and attempt to patch them. After considering all of the issues 
raised by my research, the question with which I am now struggling is this: If one feels 
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that his or her rights are being violated and there is no political mechanism by which to 
negotiate, is it advisable, or at least morally permissible, to pick up arms and fight? 
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